ETHNICITY ISSUES IN LITHUANIAN-POLISH RELATIONSHIPS

Solidarity of Nations Seminar at Vilnius University

Thursday, 21st of November 2013

with contributions of

Egidijus Aleksandravičius, Pieter van Houten, Mitja Žagar, Leszek Zasztowt
# SOLIDARITY OF NATIONS SEMINAR: ETHNICity ISSUES IN LITHUANIAN-POLISH RELATIONSHIPS

Vilnius, Universiteto 9/1-201  
Thu, 21st November 2013

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| 13.45–14.05 | Chair: Doc. Dr. Vaidotas A. Vaičaitis, Vilnius University  
Prof. Leszek Zasztowt, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw  
"Being a Polish in Lithuania - a perspective of a Polish historian" |
| 14.05–14.25 | Prof. Egidijus Aleksandričius, Vytautas Magnus University  
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Dr. Pieter van Houten, University of Cambridge  
"Exploitation of ethnic identity in the political struggle" |
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Notice

This publication is a transcription of the presentations that were given on the “Solidarity of Nations Seminar: Ethnicity Issues in Lithuanian-Polish Relationships” at Vilnius University on Thursday, 21st of November 2013.

The Speakers of the Seminar had the freedom to adjust the following pages which for that reason might not be considered as an exact verbatim protocol. In addition the moderation, questions and answers as well as the discussions are not transcribed.

If you would like to experience the full seminar you can find the video recording of the seminar at the web site of the Institute of Eastern European Law: www.iorr.uni-koeln.de

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A. First Session

- Chair: Doc. Dr. Vaidotas A. Vaičaitis, Vilnius University
- Prof. Leszek Zasztowt, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw
  “Old Lithuanians” – Some critical remarks on socio-ethnical origins of Poles in historic Lithuania
  Video reference: 00:05:00 – 00:37:15
- Prof. Egidijus Aleksandravičius, Vytautas Magnus University
  “Historic perspectives of Polish – Lithuanian relationships”
  Video reference: 00:38:05 – 00:57:00

The seminar and this publication tries to broaden the approach on the topic of ethnicity not only from a legal or lawyer point of view, but also with an historian perspective for a broader and better understanding. Ethnicity is not something that derives out of law, but is an issue which is pre existence also in our mentality and way of thinking and derived of this we have legal outcomes and solutions; i.e. like nationality, the spelling in our passports or legal documents and others. However out of their history some ethnicity groups have certain tensions which need to be healed. But in order to be healed these issues need to be revealed. The first part of the seminar and this publication will take an historical approach, whereas the second part will try to an analysis form an ethnic studies and national minority studies point of view.
I. “Old Lithuanians”
Some critical remarks on socio-ethnical origins of Poles in historic Lithuania

Prof. Leszek Zasztowt, Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw

The concept of “old Lithuanians” introduced into the scholarly literature by Krzysztof Buchowski¹ and popularized by Alfredas Bumblauskas², gained a significant popularity not only in Poland, but first of all in the Lithuanian intellectual milieu. The term seems to be sympathetic, meaningful and earned even some warm appreciation also in Polish historical circles.

Although one should stress that this concept is not as fresh and new as it seems. Before Buchowski’s book was published we had a very useful idea of “Lithuanian in the old sense of the word” – though Polish by culture”, popularized by Czeslaw Milosz et alteres to define some people who descend from historic Lithuania (contemporary Lithuania and Belarus). There was a lot of such in “old sense Lithuanians” as for example the rank of personages from a previous century as: Zygmunt Jundziłł, Wiktor Sukiennicki, Stanisław Swianiewicz, Kazimierz Okulicz, Stanisław Kościałkowski, Władysław Wielhorski and many others³. To some extent this concept covered also a unique personality of the master – Czesław Milosz himself. So the idea of the “Lithuanians in the old sense of the word” was present since 1950s and 1960s, and probably has emerged much earlier – at least since the beginning of the 20th century when the national tensions started to be apparent.

This concept, similarly to other socio-linguistic terms, mirrors the reality in spe only to a certain degree⁴. It aims at interpreting the real state of affairs in historic Lithuania, concerning the origins of the significant part of its inhabitants who at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century defined themselves as local Poles or local Belarusians or even any representaties of other nationality who were non-pure blood modern Lithuanians. The

¹ K. Buchowski, Litwomani i polonizatory: wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy w stosunkach polsko-litewskich w pierwszej połowie XX wieku, Białystok 2006.
³ There is a list of those people as the authors of the history of Grand Duchy of Lithuania territories, published in Polish in London by the academic community of the Stefan Batory University in exile in the series Alma Mater Vilnensis, entitled: Dzieje ziem Wielkiego Księstwa litewskiego. Cykl wykładów, London 1953, edited by: Zygmunt Jundziłł, Stanisław Kościałkowski, Kazimierz Okulicz i Władysław Wielhorski.
word “local” seems to be a crucial key to understand the whole issue – by the way – it also explains the specific feature of the Belarusian identity on those territories. But – on the other hand – it also creates a specific feature or phenomenon and a certain “misty” atmosphere around this group of people from Lithuania, who – to say it frankly – in their majority might be simply defined as human beings of the Polish descend. In other words it weaken and dilutes the firm national divisions, which were apparent – or just started to be clearly visible – at the end of the 19th century on the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Using this expression was a kind of ascent to create a new socio-ethnical category, which in fact tried to deprive to some extent those “old Lithuanians” of their real national character. Nevertheless Polish or – for example – Belarusian. One of the first scholars who pointed out this issue was Juliusz Bardach in his renown text about the multilevel consciousness of Poles in historic Lithuania of the 19th - 20th century.

So who were those strange people? They were Poles, but with a certain Lithuanian past, which must be interpreted as solid Lithuanian roots from the ancient, historical era. These roots were in the modern times lost, but the genetic and ethnic links survived, even while those bonds were unconscious and unarticulated by those newly created figures in their fresh ethnic category.

One of the specific charts of the consciousness of those speaking Polish “old Lithuanians” was their aversion to the neighboring Poles from the congress Kingdom of Poland created in 1815, who were treated as a close brothers but – in common opinion – they were unquestionably on a lower level in their civilization status. They represented a pure Polish milieu, in a form of the Piast dynasty tradition, while the “old Lithuanians” were settled in their glorious, multinational and ‘all-embracing’ Jagiellonian past. This was the tradition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the powerful state located in the heart of Europe, settled from the Baltic See on the North, to the Black See on the South. This Jagiellonian and the Grand Duchy idea – in their opinion – was much more significant, much older even with the Roman roots, and of course much better than the simple old Polish tradition represented by kings like Mieszko and Boleslaw Chrobry, not to mention about the Casimir the Great.

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As a result of this approach a kind of regional sentiments, the post Commonwealth of Two
Nations’ feelings, arose up and on the quite incredible scale and have been elevated up to the
level of nearly vital and “national” divisions.

In this specific way the term “old Lithuanians” enters and opens a kind of Pandora box. It
leaver and shakes an opinion that Poles in historic Lithuania were the same Poles as their
compatriots living in Poland (ethnic Polish territories) or in any other country of the former
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after its partitions i.e. in Polish part of Prussia – the Duchy
of Poznan or in Silesia, or in the Austrian Galicia.

On the other hand it fortify and strengthen the Lithuanian ethnic element in this whole socio
puzzle. Lithuanian ethnic roots are elevated and uplifted to a higher level of understanding
and defining the peculiarity of Polish speaking group in Lithuania.

In this text I try to describe my own approach to this concept from a point of view of modern
Lithuanians and modern Poles. Then I try to present in short words a kind of a photo of the
Polish speaking circles and its socio-ethnic origins at the threshold of the 20th century. Finally
I would dare to ask some crucial and vital questions, why the term “old Lithuanians”,
although very useful and even sympathetic for us, might be perceived as humiliating and
degrading from a strict Polish point of view. The ultimate issue would be the question: who
was a Pole in Lithuania of that time before World War One? What was the political result of
this Polish identity at the moment of gaining independence by both countries – Lithuania and
Poland in 1918?

1. A Lithuanian approach

As every Lithuanian knows the modern Lithuanian political thought was erected on the
remnants of Polish-Lithuanian friendship. The ties between our two nations constructed and
strengthened before 1795 were so strong that strangled the ethnic Lithuanian identity, which
was not only in danger, but in fact was captured and subdued to by the Polish tradition and
customs. Therefore to create a modern, independent Lithuanian nation the condition sine qua
non was the necessity to break those bonds and ties with Poles and Poland. To stay firm
against our previous Polish cohabitants was the only direction which guaranteed a chance for
victory and a remedy to rebuild the modern nation. That is why one of the fathers of modern
Lithuanian revival – Jonas Basanavičius (Jan Basanowicz) – preferred to speak Russian than Polish. The Russian language was less dangerous. The concept of “old Lithuanians” was in fact present in the modern Lithuanian tradition from its very beginning. That was also a conditio sine qua non. The fathers of the Lithuanian national revival were absolutely sure that significant part, and maybe a nearly majority of their beloved Lithuanians, is trapped in Polish bonds. When the Lithuanian Republic army was created in 1918 the only language to obey orders and commands was – as enemy says – Polish.

After 1918 Lithuanization embraced the whole population of the newly reborn Republic and succeeded in a quite short period of time. The ideological foundation for this re-Lithuanization was the concept of historic Lithuanians who lost their national consciousness during the ages. At that decisive moment no one cared about the real national roots of the inhabitants of the Republic. If you were a Pole or a Belarusian, a Jew or of the Tatar descend, each person had to and have been equally transformed into the modern Lithuanian citizen. The common platform was of course the language.

Summarizing this process of the inter-war re-Lithuanization, one must say that on the base of Lithuanian origins sometimes treated very artificially, the representatives of many nations of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania have been re-captured and re-embraced by the modern Lithuanian identity. This phenomenon was probably one of the most spectacular successes of the Republic of Lithuania before 1939, although no one of its politicians was eager to advertise those actions all around the interwar European public opinion.

Although the term “old Lithuanians” was not in use at that moment – as far as I know – the concept was fully implemented during the process of creating the modern Lithuanian nation. At the moment of implementing this new ideas at the beginning of the 20th century, new modern Lithuanians gained the names of the Litwoman (Lithuanian-men vel “maniac”), which was defining their positions with a negative attitude by their enemies – mostly Lithuanian

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Poles, with strongly formulated Polish identity, treated by modern Lithuanians as Polonizers\(^\text{11}\).

Looking at the re-born Lithuanian identity after 1918, one might say that it was founded on the concept of conversion of all former nations of the Grand Duchy: Poles and the “old-Poles”, Belarusians and the “old-Belarusians”, Russians and the “old-Russians”, as well as Tatars and the “old-Tatars”. More or less – one must to admit that frankly – the idea from a point of view of its utility for a new, reborn state was brilliant and fully implemented with an ultimate success.

2. A Polish idea

The concept of “old Lithuanians” in some form was also apparent between the Lithuanian Poles at the beginning of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. Although the term was not in use, the idea was present especially in the circle of the Vilnius so-called Locals (Krajowcy). They have been representatives of the non-numerous group of Polish intelligentsia living in historic Lithuania, who foreseen the future re-born state as a – in specific way – re-created and refurbished former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which would be in a close cooperation and in federal alliance with Poland.

Identifying themselves with historic Lithuania they long for and desire to make a peace agreement between modern Lithuanians, who were focused on the creating of their modern state and the local Polish community as well as with other national/ethnic groups descending from the Grand Duchy. Therefore they aimed at establishing of the common area or an open space for the future alliance between Polish and Lithuanian national identity and the idea of the independent Lithuanian state. Some of them fully accepted this idea of an independent Republic of Lithuania, without any preconditions especially concerning future political or federal ties with Poland. In the ranks of the exclusive representatives of this elite of intellectuals were, among others, Ludwik Abramowicz, Stanisław Narutowicz, Michał Römer, Roman Skirmunt, Tadeusz Wróblewski\(^\text{12}\). They might be characterized by their firm anti-nationalistic approach, refusing both: the Polish and Lithuanian nationalism, as well as the Belarusian, Russian or Jewish one. They often defined themselves as “democrats”, in contemporary sense of the word, with a significant dose of tolerance and understanding for


aspirations of other nations who were concentrated at establishing their own independent national organisms. Some of them represented the populist and left political factions, including social democrats. Some of them were linked with the Vilna freemasonry. Their main adversary and opponent in the local Polish political environment were the representatives of the Polish nationalist movement – the National Democracy (Narodowa Demokracja) – which finally overcome and won in Polish political sphere.

The Polish speaking community at the threshold of the 20th century represented all social spheres of the local society. As a kind of social entity they gradually found themselves under a significant influence of the Józef Pilsudski political philosophy, which expanded and spread the idea of federation of the former national elements of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – Rzeczpospolita. Despite of that, because of the hard conditions of the war and especially because of the war with Bolsheviks, they gradually changed their points of view and started to be the strong adherents of the National Democracy. In practice that meant elimination of all other nationalities from the political sphere, and establishing a mono-nation structure: an exclusively Polish state. No federation but one homogenous state organism.

Those who did not turn their views into new direction were mostly intellectuals, linked with the circles of – already mentioned – Vilna “Locals”. Also the Polish Socialist Party was at that moment quite influential in historic Lithuania.

How this situation, before the First World War, might be presented concerning the various strata of the Polish society in Lithuania? Let’s make a short observation.

3. Nobility (Polish or Polonized)

After a romance with the Tsarist authorities in the second half of the 19th century and during the short period of Russian parliament Duma (1905-1914) previously loyal to the Russian government Polish nobility started to be politically separated from any possibility of influence on upcoming events and changes. They did not have any impact on the state of affairs. Although they have been en masse more or less conscious of their Lithuanian or Ruthenian (Belarusian) roots, the majority of them had been already homogenously united with the idea of Poland. Its independence was – similarly as during the January Uprising of 1863 – the main purpose and the crucial political goal for the majority of the gentry. Although should be stressed that this situation looked differently in various strata of the Lithuanian nobility. But the period of a loyal approach to Russia finally ended when the war broke through.

13 The situation was similar to Ukraine. See: D. Beauvois, Trójkąt Ukraiński. Szlachta, carat i lud na Wołyniu, Podolu i Kijowszczyźnie 1793-1914, Lublin 2005, especially the third part of this trilogy, p. 475-731.
The aristocracy (vel the magnates or the baronages) was cosmopolitan, officially pro-Russian, however they have been very close or even fully devoted to the Polish patriotic views, especially to the military and political activity of Piłsudski. Of course there were exceptions. The people who supported Lithuanian or Belarusian national endeavors, but these were figures literally non numerous and on the margin of Polish political main stream. Also the aristocracy pro-Russian sympathies ceased quickly to exist during the war\textsuperscript{14}. The rich landowners stratum called often the Crimsons (\textit{Karmazyny}) settled in their broad mansions, although less economically powerful than aristocracy, was also fully devoted in their majority to the idea of the independence of Poland. Because of their ties with other families of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the ethnic Polish territories, they have been even more pro-Polish in their views than the aristocracy\textsuperscript{15}. In these circles it was also less links and bounds with the representatives of Russian, Austrian or Prussian aristocracy\textsuperscript{16}.

But the most patriotic was the lesser gentry or the petty nobility, which was a fuel for all Polish insurrections since the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century thru the whole 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Those families gave a huge support for all Polish political factions and parties. In historic Lithuania the majority of them was – more or less – linked with Polish independence movement, which at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century was called the “progress youth” or simply \textit{niepodległościowcy} - the “advocates of sovereignty”\textsuperscript{17}.

Predominantly from that circle appeared the most patriotic Polish individuals, who in big numbers created a main stream of the Polish intelligentsia. In those circles was no place for any different way of thinking as to fight for freedom and independence. They were rebels, revolutioneers, educated in a tradition of Romantic literature and in the imperative of struggle for the revival of Poland\textsuperscript{18}.


\textsuperscript{15} D. Szpoper, \textit{Sukcesorzy Wielkiego Księstwa. Myśl polityczna i działalność konserwatystów polskich na ziemiach litewsko-białoruskich w latach 1904-1939}, p. 3 and following.


\textsuperscript{17} About the situation on the Eastern territories after the first world war see: J. Gierowska – \textit{K a 1 l a u r}, \textit{Zarząd Cywilny Ziem Wschodnich (19lutego 1919-9 września 1920)}, Warszawa 2003, p. 38 and following pages.

\textsuperscript{18} See the excellent memoires book about the petty nobles during the interwar period and the World War Two: W. Miko, \textit{Zaściankowi rozrabiacy w kresowym kolorycie}, Olszyn 2000.
As wrote Michał Römer in his Memorandum of 1915: “In the landowners spheres of Lithuania, especially between the elements which are far from the politics and less active in the Agricultural Societies – they preserved a vivid memory of national harm, the traditions of heroic struggles, national uprisings and the martyrdom. Those traditions are not always a stimulus to act, even that happens very rarely, they are terrorized by the memory of defeats and pressure, which are treated as a relics of the ancient sacred past”\(^{19}\).

This Polish and patriotic lesser gentry was divided into the numerous categories, based mostly on their poor economic condition and very low financial status. There were in the general so called: petty nobles or yeomanry (drobna szlachta). But they have been also divided in too many different circles as szlachta zaściankowa – the yeomen’s gentry or a lesser gentry living in small villages where they have been very often close relatives, szlachta okoliczna – a local gentry living in surroundings, szlachta zagrodowa – the croft or farm gentry, these were constituted of the owners of one, small farm (zagroda), szlachta chodaczkowa – the minor-“clog” gentry, who possessed only a pair of shoes. On the bottom of this social scale were the bobyle and the golota categories, who had no land and no property at all. The term golota, came from the words “naked” or “nude” vel “bare”, and meant the people deprived of any property. The bobyle category might be translated as those “who were”, who settled in an ancient times and have the noble roots (what is widely known), but they have nothing more, even no documents about their noble past\(^{20}\).

During the Russian rule another “old” social categories of the gentry or of the semi-gentry were created or simply implemented on a quite significant scale, as for example the odnodvortsy and ghrazhdanie of Western Provinces, who were petty nobles degraded into the peasantry stratum in 1831-1870. The ultimate numbers of those people covered over 350 thousand. On the other hand there were non-numerous groups of military figures as for example the armored boyars or the cuirassier boyars, who owned small farms on the borderland and had similar duties to Cossacks, as well as puszkarze – the gunners, strzelcy – the riflemen, kopijnicy – the spearmen, and different ranks of cavalry and dragoons. Also the various circles of lesser Cossacks were represented. The common feature of those people was

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that during the Russian rule, but probably also earlier, they all belonged to the circle of *sluzhylyie ludi* – the so called service men stratum\(^{21}\).

In general in the nobility circles nearly all Polish political tendencies were present, but one factor was dominant. That was, as Michal Römer observed, the anti-Russian approach and a significant lack of confidence in any possible alliance with Russia. Also in this case were rare exceptions as – for example – a hateful and odious count Adam Gurowski, who was commonly acknowledged as not only Russian zealot but as a simple Tsarist spy (whom in fact he really was)\(^{22}\).

**4. Intelligentsia and burghers**

Similar tendencies are visible in the ranks of Polish intelligentsia in historic Lithuania. At the end of 19\(^{th}\) century and at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century *en masse* they followed the general streams of Polish political thought, and played much the same role as petty nobles, with whom they were very often close relatives. Medicine doctors, hospital attendants, nursery maids, chemists, private teachers, house keepers, lower rank officials, lawyers and jurists, stewards of the estates, students and high school disciples, but also merchants, shoe makers, butchers, tradesmen and craftsmen as well as peddlers and chapmen (if they were not of the Jewish origin). They all were at the beginning under the significant influence of the Polish independence movement. This was a nucleus or a core of a newly born lower sphere of the Polish middle class at historic Lithuania.

In my opinion those people were less interested in any national/ethnic differences, and constituted a typical Polish approach, where was no place for any re-thinking of the positions of modern Lithuanians or modern Belarusians. The majority of those people, who lived in bigger or smaller Lithuanian and Belarusian towns, gradually – as the eve of the First World War was approaching – entered or occupied the positions of the Polish national democracy movement – the so called ND-tsia. In majority they have been supporters of the idea of an independent Poland, but as a monolithic – mono-state – constructed and founded by and exclusively for Poles\(^{23}\).

In general it might be resumed that the younger generation was more pro “independence movement” oriented, while the older generation was more pro-“national democratic” nationalist stream. This is clearly visible in Michał Römer Memorandum of 1915. He noticed

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\(^{21}\) Ibidem, p. 35.


that as far as Polish national democracy in Vilna was pro-Russian, they were separated from the main stream of society, but when they changed this approach, it resulted in a significant broadening of the group of their supporters. In fact after 1918 the ND-tsia dominated the Vilna Polish political sphere.

5. Polish speaking peasantry
In the ranks of the peasantry living in historic Lithuania one might find people of Polish descend as well as Lithuanians, Ruthenians (Belarusians and Ukrainians), Russians (Old Believers), Karaites and probably some more of lesser national/ethnic elements.

On a side of the Polish speaking peasantry there were farmers from typical peasant families, but also the representatives of the – already mentioned – degraded and outcast petty noblemen (called odnodvortsy and ghrazhdanie of the Western Provinces of Russian Empire), who were at the end of the 19th century mostly chynsheviki – farmers who paid their land rent, after the 1861 enfranchise reform, and the end of serfdom.

In this milieu there were peasants from quite wealthy families, equally with the owners of the middle-seized farms as well as the poor and non-possessing figures.

Their national/ethnic roots were differentiated. There is no adequate research on that issue, but one might agree that they have been partly of the Polish descend, partly of the Lithuanian descend. But the vast majority was probably Polonized Belarusians who constituted a significant part of peasantry. Those “national” divisions were very fluid and flexible, and depended very often on a political situation in the country. Their declared identity often has been a side effect of the political events, which overwhelmed the inhabitants of historic Lithuania, as for example the January Uprising of 1863, or the 1905 revolution in the empire.

Unconditionally Belarusians formed the most numerable ethnic group, first of all on the South and East territories of the historic Lithuania. They have been also the most neglected and subordinated social group. They often called themselves “locals”, to run out of the consequences of defining their own nationality. Those “locals” were nearly always the Orthodox Church supporters and they were treated by Tsarist authorities as Russians. If they were of a Catholic background they were defined as Poles. Of course they spoke Polish equally with Belarusian, and that is why I include them into the Polish speaking peasantry.

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24 M. Römer, op. cit., p. 65-78.
This division between the Orthodox “Russians” and Catholic “Poles” was the most visible thru the whole 19th century on those territories. The Lithuanian, Catholic peasantry started to be isolated and separated from the others by the Tsarist authorities at first in the Kaunas Province (Kovno gubernia) in Samogitia, then also in other provinces of the Western region. Because of their Slavic bonds Belarusians were also the most seductive element both for Poles and Russians in their political ideology to transform them into one of those modern nations. After 1918 Polish politics to Belarusians living on the East of the Second Polish Republic was, to say it gently, catastrophic and devastating. It is documented by the research of Józef Obrębski and Seweryn Wysłouch, which was recently published26. There was no place for any reasonable approach to Belarusian national identity. Therefore they in their majority have chosen the Bolshevik option.

A Polonization processes were triggered after the January Uprising of 1863, equally with the national revival of Lithuanians and Belarusians. These phenomena are still not developed in modern history research. But they have been realized and observed even by the Polish historiography and social studies before 1939: as for example in Władysław Wielhorski works27, where he points out the regress of Lithuanian language in the 19th century when this language was replaced by local dialects of Belarusian and Polish.

To summarize one must say that the social group of Polish speaking peasantry in historic Lithuania, although maybe non numerous and differentiated from the ethnic point of view, was still visible and in some places even predominant as in the Vilna city surroundings at the beginning of the 20th century.

6. Clergy

The Roman Catholic clergy was divided into two separate camps at least since 1880s and 1890s. The modern Lithuanian one and the Polish one. The tragic moments when those divisions started to be advertised and came in to social notice was the beginning of the 20th century at the moment of Polish-Lithuanian quarrels about the language of ceremonies in the church. Roman Catholic clergy en masse as Michał Römer wrote was anti-Russian in their Polish part as well as in their Lithuanian core. But the nationalist divisions – Polish versus Lithuanian– were the most transparent and visible.

What concerns the Orthodox clergy, they have been en masse pro-Russian, and despite of their predominantly Belarusian roots, the majority of the clergy supported the Russian Empire

and was a kind of transmission belt for the progress of a Russification processes in the country. They thought in the Moscow categories, including the time measures and the old calendar, even after the October revolution, when the Moscow’s Orthodox patriarchate was already subdued to the Bolshevik secret service (Cheka) and subsequently to the NKVD. The protestant clergy were in general pro-Polish, and linked with the local intelligentsia, who defined themselves as Polish.

7. Conclusion
The 17th century Vilnius and Lithuania were a very tolerant town and country, where each person could live without any troubles in the multiethnic surroundings. It is perfectly described in the recent book of David Frick: *Kith, Kin and Neighbors. Communities & Confessions in Seventeenth-Century Wilno*\(^{28}\). There were Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist, as well as Russian – Muscovy – Orthodox, Muslim Tatars, Mosaic Jews, Karaites and even some others. They also represented a multiethnic milieu - the proto “nationals”: Poles, Lithuanians, Ruthenians (Belarusians), Germans (Saxons), French, Italians, Scots and many others. What has happened with this colorful environment after nearly three centuries, at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, especially in the capital town of Vilnius?

Frankly saying some of those previous divisions survived\(^{29}\). The ethnic environment has preserved many of its ancient specific charts. On the other hand the processes of language implementation also seriously accelerated. Polish language – forbidden to be use in public places by Tsarist authorities after the 1863 January Uprising – earned some special popularity and grounded its foundations as the most popular tool of interpersonal relations, in spite of the officially supported and glorified Russian. Other languages were also still present and in use as: Belarusian, Jewish (Yiddish), Lithuanian (old dialects and the new literary language) and many others. But the Polonization was overwhelming in the whole social sphere. All those – Polish speaking – local inhabitants, despite of their ethnic roots, might be defined as “Old Lithuanians”. But a significant part of them simply chose a straight Polish option.

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II. Historic perspectives of Polish – Lithuanian relationships
Prof. Egidijus Aleksandravičius, Vytautas Magnus University

Polish historiography knows a lot about the “old Lithuania”, but less about the new one. Nevertheless Lithuanian historiography knows extremely little about Poland.

When we speak about an “old Lithuanian” identity and some sort of transformation during the 19th century “Spring of Nations” time to the period of creating “new Lithuanian” identity, it touches the Polish side too. I could agree that the notions popularized by Czeslaw Milosz, that during this time in this region, Lithuanians showed some sort of miracle by surviving when everybody was so certain that it is a vanished kingdom. Lithuania survived, was reborn in the end of the 19th century, but strangely was reborn from the subject of political civilization to the product of philology.

Through a very sharp and theoretical differentiate approach it would be a difference between ethno-political identity based on civic values and on the rule of law and an ethno-nationalist understanding of the nation or the people, only as their spiritual phenomena.

On the one hand there is a nation state in terms of an empire structure consisting with multi-confession, multi-linguistic, multi-social, multi-genetic and multi-territorial formation. The opposite is a very narrow ethno-nationalist description. The community is speaking one language and living stable together.

During 600 years starting from the old Lithuanian Grand Duchy and the old Lithuanian republic those terms of identity happened and old Lithuanians meant different things then new Lithuanians in the beginning of the 20th century.

One problem of the Lithuanian identity and development from the old complicate one to a less complicated but still painful new one, was based on that during those 200 years the modern nation got time to rewind, rebirth and reconstruct itself. Only through a couple of decades this nation got freedom. Political freedom to construct those ethno-political civic values or reconstruct and restore those values Lithuania developed in the 14th-16th century. Being occupy during a long time in the 19th century by the Russian Empire and again for 40 years by an even harsher Soviet regime, Lithuania managed to survive or to defend in the ethno-linguistic branches. Because it was impossible to form understandings and some form of identity by the rule of law, when Lithuania was occupied and the laws were Russian. This is still a very important problem for the historical Lithuanian identity and mentality and sometimes not only in Lithuania but in all post-soviet or post-communist areas. Out of this
arises a very tricky and chameleonic relation to the important and symbolically important rule of law or the constitution of a Lithuanian state. If you ask any Lithuanian who or what he is, he would answer “Lithuanian, because I love freedom and believe in the Lithuanian state”. If you leave that quotation and compare that with bigger nations or other nations that were able to build their identity by the rule of law and civic society you have to understand that Lithuania already reached that in the 17th century and almost forget it during the decades of repression, occupation and living under the conditions of Russian enforced laws and their political system. In addition Lithuania almost lost their language during this time. Other means of identification, like religion was not as complicated as in Bosnia but not less complicated. It was simple enough to recognize a frontier of Catholicism and recognize were Islamic or Russian civilization starts, but it was so difficult to establish where the demarcation lines between Polish and Lithuanian Catholicism was, because both nations were Catholics. This has not to be underestimated.

In addition to the comments of my learned colleague Leszek Zasztowt, which was a very good synthesis, I might add only one thing.

The old understanding of the Poles and Polishness – not in terms of ethno-linguistic nationalism – could not be decoded by Lithuanian historians. Based on the insight of Janusz Tazbir or Juliusz Bardach works, for example Janusz Tazbirs Polish noble culture could repeat and prove the understanding of the Poles in the old times was not in terms of contemporary nationalism. The Poles were nobleman like old Lithuanias were nobleman, only they (old Lithuanians) were citizens, they were the nation and people. There were a lot of people, peasants, Jews and others overall a lot of different groups, but the understanding of nation was perceived as the ethno-political entity. The Kingdom of Poland never ruled over Grand Duchy of Lithuania, even if Polish civilization and language approached in Lithuanian life. According to one strange but extremely popular Lithuanian narrative, Poland and Catholic bishops at the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century were so certain to tell they do not agree with the hardest Lithuanian nationalist who started with the first Lithuanian periodical Aušra, because they always blamed Poles for Polonization of Lithuania and sort of repressions in the past. However you have to hold in mind, Poland never ruled, never fought, and never conquered Lithuania. There were only unions’, negotiations and a certain
civilization impact that was “given” by Poland and chosen by Lithuanians. Lithuanians have chosen the polish language as lingua franca.

However you have to see a confusion in the contemporary world – especially Lithuanian – if you compare historiographies. At the moment there might not be a problem in the understanding of historiographies with each other while using the same methods and categories. However the national narrative, popular notion and collective memory and collectives form of identification are sometimes so distant from historiography. In Lithuania it becomes really a problem if you step away of the topic of old Lithuania and Grand Duchy and for example talk about the role of Lithuania during the holocaust. During twenty years Lithuanian historiography reached a very high level of reconstructing all atrocities that had happened in Lithuania and the participation of Lithuania in these events. However the public opinion was not affected by that. If you have a look on the public opinion, for example comments on the internet you will see that historiography means one thing and the national narrative means something else. But in the end, if you compare the approach of historians, literature professionals and cultural historians you will find a common ground and I can agree more or less with the opinion of Leszek Zasztowt.

The debate between Leszek Zasztowt and me is very old. We started our discussion in the early 80s in the dark times of communist martial law in Poland, but since that have meet many times. For example we meet on one archival piece and one case that took place in mid 19th century, more or less around 1853 - 1855. Documents concentrated on the case, when Russian Ministry of Education decided to try to separate Lithuanians and Poles in the secondary schools of Lithuania. Three years they did some sort of research, they counted and calculated and then Leszek and myself meet interpreting similar documents of conclusion of the Russian administration.

So what was the conclusion? Basically, “we can’t do that”, because it is impossible to manage this process. It is impossible to recognize who is a real Lithuanian and who is a real Pole. Since a distinction by the name was hardly possible, because sometimes people with typical Polish name would be so deep Lithuanian nationals or patriots and vice versa people with Lithuanian names would be very national Poles. After all there was no basis which could be used to recognize who was to be accounted to what side and it was left for the historical process to solve this issue.

In this respect you have to hold in mind that there is not a simple way to reconstruct a map of a Lithuanian and a Polish identity, because it is not a problem of a demarcation line on a
political territory. The problem is that the real demarcation line lies within each individual person and by that you are left to solve these problems in the future.
B. Second Session

- Chair: Dr. Tomasz Milej, University of Cologne
- Dr. Pieter van Houten, University of Cambridge
  
  "Exploitation of ethnic identity in the political struggle"
  Video reference: 01:37:45 – 01:58:30
- Prof. Mitja Žagar, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana
  
  "Best practices to avoid ethnic conflicts"
  Video reference: 01:59:00 – 02:23:47

While talking about ethnicity problems there seem to be different ways about approaching this issue. Instead of taking a detailed approach on the variations and specific issues of ethnicity problems and minority issues, for example the spelling of names in passports or bilingual street names\(^30\) the first part of the seminar tried to take a broader position and perspective and to find the roots of these problems. Nevertheless people will often get emotional, about a misspelling of their name. The following session will try to focus on the questions that arise when we have to deal with these emotions. What are the consequences of being emotional? What is the impact of these emotions on politics and on our lives?

\(^30\) Compare Hanna Vasilevich, Lithuania’s minority - related legislation: is there a legal vacuum? ECMI working paper # 70, September 2013 (http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/WP_70_Final.pdf).
I am not an expert on the specific ethnic relations in Lithuania or Poland. My approach in this presentation would be to give some sense of “political science perspective” on ethnic relations, esp. on the political mobilization of ethnicity or ethnic identities. Through that I want to indicate some questions and arguments coming out of political science research on these issues.

Probably when we think of the mobilization of ethnic identities, we think first of conflicts, civil wars, tensions and problems. We regularly see ethnic conflicts in the media. For example, terrible cases such as Rwanda or maybe Syria nowadays. Sometimes even a bit closer to home, like for example the war in Yugoslavia or conflicts in the Caucasus. This is also what gets many political scientists interested. But research shows that these conflicts (although real and tragic) are only one aspect of ethnic relations and ethnic politics.

I’d like to give some sense to this issue and I like to do this through a discussion of what seem to me to be some common perceptions about ethnic politics and consequences of ethnic politics, and show that these are – at least, in part – based on misconceptions. Often the picture consist of more nuances and complications than you might see at first sight.

Basically I will talk about three issues. First the formation of ethnic parties, which means parties that appear as a specific ethnic group – usually a minority group – and how they try to get support. The second issue will focus on the relation between ethnic mobilization and the stability of democracies. This has been a big concern once you get ethnic mobilization which might destabilize particular fairly new democratic system or states. Finally I’ll take a look at the role of external actors especially “kin-states” in ethnic relations. A “kin-state” in political science is basically a state with strong ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic link to a minority population across the border to a neighbor country.

1. Ethnic parties
But to start, it shouldn’t surprise us that ethnic identities sometimes become politically mobilized. Ethnic identity is one of the possible “identities” of an individual that can become politically salient, especially if certain interests are tied, or (importantly) can be framed to be tied to, this identity. Such interests can be language or minority rights, but also economic
well-being, e.g. if there is perceived socioeconomic discrimination, or if a territorially concentrated ethnic group feels that it is economically constrained by state policies. One can see this in Western-Europe (which I have largely focused on in my research) that socioeconomic “discrimination” played a role for example in Northern Ireland. Or if you have a look at the discovery of North Sea oil which gave a boost to Scottish nationalism and the SNP (Scottish National Party). Economic issues also play a big role on the Catalan and Basque situation in Spain.

You see political mobilization of ethnic identities in many countries. Besides Yugoslavia, examples in Eastern Europe are Hungarian minorities in various countries, but also Russian minorities in some countries, Polish minority here in Lithuania or Turkish minority in Bulgaria.

However, there is nothing inevitable about the mobilization of ethnic identities. Indeed, many ethnic groups or possible ethnic identities do not become mobilized at all. It is an interesting question what explains this variation. Factors to think about are the existence of cultural differences (as “raw material” for mobilization), economic issues and differences, role of leadership and organization, institutional arrangements. However, this is not what I primarily like to focus on in this presentation. Instead, I want talk about situations where there is some political mobilization of ethnic identities, and in the context of a democratic political system. In this context one can discuss three common perceptions (and partial misconceptions) about the nature and implications of ethnic mobilization in such contexts.

First, if you have ethnic minorities that become political mobilized you get ethnic parties that only appeal to their own group. Through that you then receive segments of the population that will only support and a population only voting for these parties representing their own ethnic group.

There are certainly examples of this. You might find that for example in a Polish party in Lithuania or you’ll find it in some of Basque and Catalan parties.

Especially in “new democracies” voting for an ethnic party may be a sensible “shortcut” for voters. Because a clear party system or the interested of other parties might not be clearly defined yet and so people might have a look on the party which seems to be closed to their interest and an “ethnic label” might support this.

But this doesn’t apply everywhere. Sometimes ethnic parties only manage to get the small vote of some of their ‘target group’ (as some members of the ethnic group vote for broader parties). Some parties try to appeal to other voters too. For example you can find that in the
Scottish National Party, Turkish party in Bulgaria, some of the Hungarian parties in Serbia and Romania, which try to expand their support base by appealing much more broadly toward the voters.

So, how political mobilization happens in democratic contexts varies. One reason for this has to do with institutional arrangements (regime type, electoral systems). But very important is that this happens as part of a competition between parties (intra-ethnic competition between several ethnic parties – see for example Catalonia, Basque Country, Vojvodina – and inter-ethnic competition), and thus depends on strategic calculations. Recent researches by several people have started to focus on this. This research shows that ethnic parties pursue a variety of strategies.

2. Ethnic mobilization
Second you have to see ethnic mobilization and prospects for a well-functioning democracy. My perception would be that ethnic mobilization and ethnic parties can be a threat on democratic stability.

One can certainly point to some examples, if you just have look on the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, various African countries, Northern Ireland, Basque Country or perhaps even Belgium.

One argument is that political mobilization of ethnic identity will lead to ‘outbidding’, i.e. more and more radical demands (and thus instability). However, some political science research shows this is not necessarily the case. In general, ethnic groups and parties can pursue different strategies (as already mentioned), and actually become more moderate (instead of radical). As a specific example, Stroschein (University College London) argues that mobilization by Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia (not just through parties, but also through protests) helped the consolidation of democracy in these states, as it led to some concessions that moderated the demands of the Hungarian minority and (interestingly) of the majority groups too. Also, I would argue that the mobilization in Scotland or Catalonia isn’t undermining democracy, even with the presence of independence demands.

So, again one will find a mixed picture. There can be radicalization and conflict, but the point many political scientists make on this is that it isn’t ethnic mobilization as such that is the cause, but only if it combines with other factors (such as particular state responses, exclusion of minority from political power, etc.).
3. External actors
Finally when we look on the role of external actors and especially ‘kin-states’ the perception would be, that the involvement, or even just presence, of kin-states (or other supporting external actors) increases ethnic mobilization and ethnic tensions.

Some examples that seem to support this are Nazi-Germany (Sudeten Germans), Serbia, Hungary, Russia (in Georgia). But, again, this appears to be more complicated than this. In an article written a while ago, I argued that “kin-states” can in certain circumstances actually improve ethnic relations. If there is a possibility of intervention, but not direct interference it may lead states to make compromises and stabilize ethnic relations. If you, for example, have a look on Russia and Russian minorities in Estonia and Ukraine (Crimea) this actually may find support.

In a recent article on this issue of “kin-state” effects Cederman et al (2013) conclude, after a broad statistical analysis, something similar on the role of kin-states – particular the bigger and stronger ones – in civil and ethnic conflict.

One point to take away from this is that intentions and actions of kin-states can vary. They may use the situation of ‘their’ minorities abroad for domestic political gain, but do they really want to get involved in potential conflicts?

4. Conclusion
I have tried to give some sense of what political scientists have looked at (and are looking at) in relation to the political mobilization of ethnic identities and some of the arguments and conclusions that they put forward. Essentially, I hope it gives a nuanced picture of the nature and effects of the political mobilization of ethnic identities (as these seem to vary considerably).

The big question then, of course, is under what conditions certain patterns and effects occur. This is what political science research is more and more grappling with, but much more needs to be done. However, I did give some suggestions of factors that matter. For example the response of states towards their minority matters, the parties’ competitions with each other and institutional arrangements and institutional designs and how this might effect the overall outcome.
II. Best practices to avoid ethnic conflicts

Prof. Mitja Žagar, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Ljubljana

I’d like to point out that I am also not an expert on Polish-Lithuanian relationships and particularly not of the development of ethnicities and identities in this part of the world. However I did study about the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth at a certain point in my life, namely I did my PhD in contemporary federalism and one of the historic cases was about the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth.

Being aware of the historic traditions one has probably to be slightly less idealistic, particularly in view of the problems that existed and the dominance that existed at that time and also from the perspective of human rights on the diverson and exclusions that existed within the commonwealth.

However, there are positive traditions where you can build upon. It was not exclusively to this area of Europe, but also to some other parts of Europe is the tradition of coexistence, the tradition of respect and the tradition of cooperation. In addition there is tradition which you could describe as the tradition of “making the borders” among different groups. Be them ethnic, religious or class (society status). This structures borders and ports, as there was always a way to pass from one part to another. Today from this exclusivist, reductionist perception of national discourse on ethnicity this is frequently forgotten.

Yet this issue does not only apply to ethnicity, but also to religion. However religion is one of the topics people are reluctant to negotiate about. You might not be willing to negotiate much about ethnicities, but ethnicity is also politics in contrast to religion were one would not think about politics at first sight, but nevertheless religion is also politics.

I would like to start by stating that diversities and asymmetries exist in every sphere of human life and with many dimensions. They are normal phenomena and state of affairs. The perceptions that our society is homogeneous, unified and unison are actually completely against the reality that we see daily.

The second point, that I would like to make, is that diversities and plurality can be the basis for diverse interests and diverse interests can result in diverse and possible conflicting interests. As a consequence crises and conflicts are normal phenomena and state of affairs. The actual problem is how we do understand and handle them.
When we are speaking ethnicity we have to be aware that ethnicity is a single dimension of diversity. If you take class, gender or whichever social characteristic you might think of can be used to explore how diverse our societies are. However what is specific about ethnicity is, that ethnic identity seems to be one of the strongest collective identities throughout history. In a way how we establish ourselves as persons or individuals and how we do establish ourselves collectives’ individual entities, is we compare ourselves with others.

Basically through two processes: A process of assimilation; i.e.”I want to be like the other side, that I am taking as my role model” or dissimilation “I want to be different from them”. If you take a child for example. During early stages of its development it will initially following an assimilation, till a certain point where dissimilation becomes more important.

If one takes this analogy, societies are not that different from an individual. However we should be aware of that in societies there are actually two dimensions. One is the individual dimension and the other is the communal dimension (collective entities). There are not mutual exclusive. It is right to the contrary. In order to create a perception of relatively social safety and social security that we all need, we actually need to find the best way to combine them.

I would also like to say that if you take a look on collective entities in a traditional way, we usually see them exclusively. We usually draw the lines of border that divides us from the others. However the borders are usually the issue of perception. The difference between official history and historiography as a history science is that official histories are constantly interpretations from the political and social perspective of historic facts and particularly their interpretation. This is why in scholarly circles on can find quite easily consensus on specific historic events or on specific historic interpretation even though there might be a different view on certain specific interpretation. But when it comes to political discourse and political mobilization of history there is difference. Usually one political group, political party or elite dominates the discourse and makes it exclusive in order to somehow preserve its own monopoly of power.

In this context there are a few characteristic of social phenomena in general, that have to be pointed out. Particularly considering that ethnicity –as seen from a nationalist perspective– is seen as an absolute construct and concept. Namely all social phenomena, including ethnicity, crisis, conflict and democracy or whatever one thinks about are actually a process. It is always
a complex, structured and dynamic processes that constantly evolve and have the following dimensions.

The first one is relational (social). There is a need for links and relations between, at least two or more, individuals and/or collective entities which result in a social network(s).

Secondly you need a territorial perspective (territory), which plays an important role in ethnic conflicts in particular when different ethnic groups are claiming the same territory. It can be an actual physical existing territory or it can just be a symbolic space or territory.

Thirdly which is indirectly been addressed but frequently forgotten particularly the nations tends to do is the temporal dimension (time). Namely when we consider time we have to hold in mind that each social but also natural phenomenon has a life circle. They appear, they evolve and they disappear. Ethnicity should not be considered as something permanent, but rather as transitory process that originates in something and will eventually transform into something else.

Social phenomena are quite concrete interpretations of what is happening in the society, even though we tend to generalize them or try to make them abstract. In this framework we have to hold in mind, that when we are speaking of ethnicity, states or language we relate these concepts to a specific historic information that we know and are aware of. At the same time we consider it as kind of abstract, universally applicable concept or model. On the other hand particularly when it comes to conflict – but this also applies to other categorized phenomena – we have to be aware that each phenomenon is a specific one (sui generis). Therefore one should also take into account the specifics and differences that exist, regardless of the common characteristics.

In this context comes along that we are not as unanimous as we try to be. Namely when we try to determine ourselves, when we ask “who am I”, we actually would tend to realize soon that we are unique. That we are similar to other persons but at least in some characterizes we are specific and that what applies as yard stick to the others cannot be completely and freely applied to us and that our yard sticks are sometimes slightly different.

However there are some similarities and common characteristics that enable an adequate and accommodated use of experiences and approaches from other environments. Successful and effective dealing with crises and conflicts in a long-term demands adequate strategies that need to adjust constantly to changing circumstances and situations.
Another question is “Does ethnic conflict per se exists?” Is the ethnicity in itself reason and source of the conflict?

There are different answers to these questions. One position would be, yes the mere fact that ethnicities exist is the reason for the conflict. In the moment you have different ethnicities you have a conflict.

My answer would be slightly different. Yes, there is potential for conflict, however ethnicity becomes important in the context of social conflict just then when it is mobilized by political elites, by movements, social political movements or by political parties as such. At that point, which ever social conflict actually gains its ethnic dimension and in a way then transforms into ethnic conflict. Once a conflict is transformed into ethnic conflict it gains its emotional and moral dimensions and you could no longer manage and handle it just rationally without considering those other dimensions.

So, is there ethnic conflict per se. My answer to that question would be actually not, however once we determine a certain conflict as an ethnic one then it definitely should be treated as such or otherwise we don’t stand many chances in managing and resolving it.

There are two approaches to these conflicts that have traditionally evolved.

One is conflict management, which is focused on the processes and tries to prevent the escalation of the conflict. The other one is goal-orientated, which is resolution of the conflict. We define what conflict is, we define both sides and try to rationalize and then come to common conclusion that will actually resolve the conflict. In the 1980s and 1990s these two schools (managers & resolutioners) were in severe conflict. However out of this conflict between these two schools in the 1990s started a new concept of transformation, conflict management and resolution which ended in introducing diversity management into social sciences.

The concept of diversity management was actually not new at that time. It was introduced in natural sciences already in the 19th century on the context of managing bio-diversity, basically already visible in the works of Darwin.

It was developed in the field of forest sciences, because the complex bio-system of a forest cannot be managed mono-dimensional. You necessarily have to take into account not only the trees that are growing there, but also all the other plants and animals, because they all together create a biotope that contributes to the health of the forest and that increases the production of the wood (the latter be the main intention for the research).
When this concept was translated or transferred into social sciences and particular put in ethnic context for example the situation on the Balkans basically the following characteristic where raised and stressed as key ingredients of diversity management.

You have to hold in mind that diversity management is a broad process which should combine all levels involved, from the local up to the global and all perspectives from short term to long term. It should be considered as a combined strategy that not only considers current developments but also past developments and predicts some possible future outcome.

The main contents of that would be recognition of the existence of pluralism and diversity and this means of all relevant social dimensions that exist in the society and might be plural and diverse. Recognition that conflicts deriving from different interests are a normal phenomena in plural societies and should be handled as such.

Finally a formal recognition and knowledge about those diversities which can then be managed in possible democratic ways and within democratic institutions.

There are different definitions of diversity management. One common would be “Diversity management is a permanent process that addresses all relevant issues of diversities and asymmetries in societies; it includes the regulation and management of socially relevant diversities, including the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts. It requires understanding, recognition, acceptance and respect of diversity, modes of coexistence and cooperation, sensitivity of people to all factors that might signal escalation of crises or conflicts and their capability to apply adequate activities and measures (which would prevent such an escalation).”

I would add that a early detection of a possible escalation of conflicts is extremely important as everybody in the community of conflict managers and conflict resolutioners basically agrees that the best chance to manage or resolve a conflict exist at the early stages of each conflict. If the preventing mechanisms and measures are successful it is quite likely that the conflict will not escalate.

Another important element is how we can actually build upon the traditions. There are some extremely positive traditions that existed in the Baltic’s, that have existed in the Balkans and that have existed in other parts of the world that have somehow been forgotten.

If we just take an example from the Balkans. Today everybody perceives Bosnia and Herzegovina as a society which is constantly torn by ethnic conflict (for a large extend a violent one). As a matter of fact –as late as in the 19th century– Jews prosecuted in Western-Europe found there refugee their safe haven inside of it. Not only from southern parts of
Western-Europe, some of the problems that accrued somewhere in the North were reflected there. You see a society that was traditionally extremely tolerant, even though not being very democratic or very inclusive, but it was rather tolerant is now perceived as one of the most exclusive societies and torn by ethnic conflict. In my view, even after ethnic conflict during World War II in this territory, relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina were actually build upon the perception of certain unity. If there is a certain indicator to this, it might be the highest share of inter-ethnic marriages throughout the world existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even after such a dreadful conflict in World War II such a development was possible. However, ethnicity in its exclusive mobilizing sense was used as political mobilize in this environment in the lack of other political infrastructure and ideologies that existed there was used to divide rather than to unite as it has been tried in the past.

Besides that example, in different parts of the world different patterns of coexistence and cooperation have developed. They might not have been always democratic, not friendly to individuals or not always friendly to all communities, however the managed to preserve relatively stable environments within which compromise was possible, within which context and cooperation’s were possible. This was extremely important. Quite frequently with the introduction of nation state, which is basically perceived as a single nation state, those mechanisms and traditions were actually forgotten.

If you ask why these traditions were forgotten you have to hold in mind that they are extremely dangerous to the exclusivist concept of nation state. As they provided for inclusion, for transition of borders and this from a perspective of nationalistic ideology –which build the concept of nation state– was unacceptable, because then homogeneity, national unity and national interest as defined by nationalist would be no longer undisputed facts and advance to which were everybody should be contributed, by becoming a way of imposed concept that is basically being used to somehow exclude the others from my own monopoly of power.

Being a lawyer and realist I am aware of that you can’t avoid the concept of nation states, however what we can do as scholars is basically that we should start discussing some failures and some problems that nation states are actually creating. Particularly when it comes to ethnic relations nation states might be to a certain extend –if there a following civic dimensions– part of the solution. However as long as every nation state I know in the world is predominately an ethnic state; they are more part of the problem and creator of the problem then part of the solution.